So, it seems to me that even our doubts when we think of a life after death can reinforce the Christian idea that our real destination is the Resurrection of the Body.
It is manifest that the happiness of the saints will increase in extent after the resurrection, because their happiness will then be not only in the soul but also in the body. Moreover, the soul's happiness also will increase in extent, seeing that the soul will rejoice not only in its own good, but also in that of the body. We may also say that the soul's happiness will increase in intensity. For man's body may be considered in two ways: first, as being dependent on the soul for its completion; secondly, as containing something that hampers the soul in its operations, through the soul not perfectly completing the body. As regards the first way of considering the body, its union with the soul adds a certain perfection to the soul, since every part is imperfect, and is completed in its whole; wherefore the whole is to the part as form to matter. Consequently the soul is more perfect in its natural being, when it is in the whole--namely, man who results from the union of soul and body--than when it is a separate part. But as regards the second consideration the union of the body hampers the perfection of the soul, wherefore it is written (Wisdom 9:15) that "the corruptible body is a load upon the soul." If, then, there be removed from the body all those things wherein it hampers the soul's action, the soul will be simply more perfect while existing in such a body than when separated therefrom. Now the more perfect a thing is in being, the more perfectly is it able to operate: wherefore the operation of the soul united to such a body will be more perfect than the operation of the separated soul. But the glorified body will be a body of this description, being altogether subject to the spirit. Therefore, since beatitude consists in an operation, the soul's happiness after its reunion with the body will be more perfect than before. (Supplement, Q. 93)
Saturday, January 29, 2011
Even our Doubts: Doubt, Afterlife, and Resurrection
Even our doubts reflect the truth of the Resurrection. I know that there are times when I don't feel like life after death will be real; it seems so distant. And yet, perhaps that is because a disembodied life after death is not the fullness of what God wants for us. Human beings are not complete creatures without their bodies, and so even though humans in heaven have the beatific vision, and therefore the fullness of overflowing happiness, they still don't have all that God means for them. They still "groan inwardly as [they] wait for adoption as sons, the redemption of [their] bodies" (Rom 8:23). I know in this I disagree with St. Thomas Aquinas' later statements, but on the whole I find his earlier statements on the topic more biblically sound. I reproduce them here:
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Where does Thomas say things that contradict this position?
ReplyDeleteAccording to the New Advent web site, he partially retracts it in ST I-II, 4, 5 ad. 5 (http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2004.htm#article5), where he says, "The desire of the separated soul is entirely at rest, as regards the thing desired; since, to wit, it has that which suffices its appetite. But it is not wholly at rest, as regards the desirer, since it does not possess that good in every way that it would wish to possess it. Consequently, after the body has been resumed, Happiness increases not in intensity, but in extent." So, it seems that Thomas believes that happiness doesn't increase in "intensity," but merely overflows to the body. But I have a hard time reconciling this both with man's nature as a body-soul complex and with such passages in Holy Scripture as Rev 6:9-10, where the souls even of martyrs are still depicted as desiring the final judgment. Albeit, they await the justice that will be done to all at the final judgment, but as N.T. Wright points out in Evil and the Justice of God (ch. 4), this justice is very much connected with bodily resurrection, since the evil that was done to someone in the body is healed in the body.
ReplyDeleteYour first reason for taking the earlier position over the latter is a little unclear. For it is not as if Thomas disregards that man is a unity of body and soul for he still says there is a difference in happiness after the soul is rejoined to the body. The change, as far as I can see it, is based on the role the body plays in the operation of the mind.
ReplyDeleteIn the latter article (ST I-II 4.5c) he seems to consider additionally that the body is only necessary for the operation of the mind on account of phantasms (which of course are not used in knowing God in the beatific vision because we cannot know God through a likeness - cf. ST I 12.2). The difference this seems to make is that it is only an accidental addition with respect to the operation of the mind in the beatific vision. [I take this based on the distinction made in the last paragraph of this article between what belongs to the essence of the perfection and what belongs to the well-being (bene esse)of having the perfection.] Therefore, since it is an accidental addition to having the beatific vision it is not an increase in intensity. That is anyway how I understand what he is arguing and the reason for the change after looking at the two articles. And this seems in perfect accord with being a body-soul unity.
Your second reason, viz. that it is difficult to reconcile with Scripture, also a little unclear since that passage as you point out expresses the point that there is a desire for justice be done (justice to all evil-doers on earth). So while of course this justice is connected to the body (because at the final judgement we will get our bodies back cf. Compendium of Theology c. 242), this justice is accidental to the happiness of the soul, that is, in having the beatific vision. In other words, this justice does not affect the degree to which the soul can attain the beatific vision.
So while this doesn't demonstrate that Thomas' mature position in the Summa is right (for there may be other objections to it), it does not seem that your objections would stand in the way of holding that position.
Matthew,
ReplyDeleteThank you for your thoughtful and well thought out reply. I apologize that I wrote my initial reply somewhat in haste, and perhaps was not as clear as I could have been. Please also know that my reply is entirely my own. It is, to the best of my knowledge, in line with the teaching of the Church and with Holy Scripture, but, of course, I submit my thought to the teaching of the Church.
After having considered the matter a bit more closely, I still hold to my initial position. Please allow me to explain why. With regard to the role of the soul in the happiness of the person in the beatific vision, we must consider it in a twofold manner:
1) With regard to the will. In this way, the intensity of happiness due to the beatific vision cannot increase because, although the will is perfectly set in charity, it can no longer merit.
2) With regard to the mind. As you point out, in the Summa, Thomas seems to say that the body is only necessary for the operation of the mind on account of the phantasms, which are wholly unnecessary for the beatific vision. The reason why this seems to me to be less anthropologically and biblically sound is that it seems to consider the mind purely in its capacity as a means of understanding, and not in its capacity as a means of regulation (for the will acts in accord with the mind). Now it is true that the mind can regulate the will, but it can also, through the will, regulate the body. And this regulation pertains to the perfection of the mind. This, I think, is what Thomas meant in the Supplement when he said "[the body's] union with the soul adds a certain perfection to the soul, since every part is imperfect, and is completed in its whole; wherefore the whole is to the part as form to matter." And since the soul (and the mind along with it) is hampered in its operation due to death, this also hampers its ability to enjoy the beatific vision. This is because, although part of seeing the beatific vision is the mode of understanding (as I mentioned above), part of it also seems to be in this second mode, the mode of regulation (even, one might say, in the mode of communication). This seems to me to be what Thomas means when he says, in the Supplement, that "beatitude consists in an operation." I believe this is more anthropologically sound, for I believe that if we only consider the mind as regards understanding, and not as regards regulation, we begin to split mind and soul from body (even if we do so unintentionally; I would not believe for a moment that Thomas intended this kind of dualism).
I also believe that this kind of an anthropology is more biblically sound. In the passage that I cited above, the souls cry out for justice to be done. You have agreed with me that the justice has to do with the resurrection of the body. The reason why I see this verse as posing a problem for Thomas' later interpretation is that, since justice is tied up with Resurrection, and the desire of the souls for justice seems to be intense, that it has to do with a desire yet unfulfilled (and thus with hope). This desire is perhaps more clearly expressed in Rom. 8:23-24a: "we ourselves, who have the first fruits of the Spirit, groan inwardly as we wait for adoption as sons, the redemption of our bodies. For in this hope we were saved."
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ReplyDeleteFinally, I will note that I believe the earlier Thomistic thought to be somewhat more in line with the tradition of the Church, based on at least two pieces of evidence (although I'm sure I could find more if I dug).
1) The Catechism of the Council of Trent, which notes that "while the soul is separated from the body, man cannot enjoy that full happiness which is replete with every good. For as a part separated from the whole is imperfect, the soul separated from the body must be imperfect. Therefore, that nothing may be wanting to fill up the measure of its happiness, the resurrection of the body is necessary." (Catechism of the Council of Trent, Article XI)
2) The breviary (Intercessions, Evening Prayer II, Sunday Week IV) also seems to hold out a kind of hope even for the souls who are in heaven, when it prays, "Fulfill your promise to those who already sleep in your peace, through your Son grant them a blessed resurrection."
Trying this again. The internets swallowed up my first rather lengthy comment.
ReplyDeleteI think we're making too much of the distinction. We have to look at what St. Thomas is trying to accomplish in the first 5 questions of the Ia-IIae. He is not attempting to describe a vision of beatitude or felicity. He is not trying to determine how various human goods fit in to felicity. His scope is much more narrow.
Look at Q3 A2. Notice how he skips all the way to the end of the Ethics. Aristotle started the Ethics by supposing that "happiness" must be an activity or operation in line with excellence or virtue, and that, if there are many activities or operations, it must be the highest, and one most specifies man as man (Ethics I 7, 12, 13, etc).
Aristotle goes through the entire ethics and builds his way up to contemplation. In his Sententia Ethicorum, written while writing the IIa-IIae, St. Thomas also goes through the Ethics, building his way up to contemplation. He also agrees with Aristotle when the Philosopher says things like that we would not call a man happy whose children turned out to be bad apples, or that no man would choose to live without friends -- although he does make the distinction between happiness in this life which requires a "perfectam vitam" (a complete life) of happiness, and happiness in the next (see Sententia Libri Ethicorum I, 10 & 13; VIII, 1).
The reason why the essence of felicity is not found in the nutritive or calculative parts of man is simply that these are common to other animals (Sententia Libri Ethicorum I, 10, n8). St. Thomas is interested in what fulfills man according to his proper function, that is according to his rational nature. This is him essential fulfillment. This doesn't mean that other things are not part of his fulfillment, but rather than they are put in a different category in St. Thomas' mind.
In A2 St. Thomas quotes St. Boethius as noting that happiness is the aggregation of all goods. In his response he interprets Boethius as meaning that happiness as "bonum perfectum", that is complete good, but he states that Aristotle was more precise because Aristotle stated that it was an operation fulfilled by the bonum perfectum.
Here St. Thomas' scope is made clear. He is not concerned at all with discussing the relationships between human goods or the various virtues in this section (he will spend the rest of the IIa talking about these things), he is only concerned with that one operation and the one one good which most especially fulfills it.
St. Thomas accepts Aristotle's position that man is most especially the mind (homo maxime est mens see Ia-IIae Q29...I think it's article 2 co.). He believes that the essence of beatitude is an intellectual vision of God. "This is Eternal life that they know you...etc" (Jn 17:3). In his mind it can be nothing else than an intellectual vision of God, since God has no parts, as he proves in the prima, and any vision through creatures or through the human nature of Jesus would be less than an essential vision of God. But it is only an essential vision of God that is capable of fulfilling the natural desire of the intellect to know the Unknown Truth, and the natural desire of the will to love the Unknown Good. Any sort of union with God other than the lumen gloriae, the beatific vision, would be essentially a union by faith and not be sight. But now we see dimly as if in mere, then we will see face to face. We will know even as we are known (1 Cor 13). He cannot fathom the union between God and man will be any sort of union by faith or mediated by creatures, even the created human nature of Jesus. It must be nothing else than the sight of the Divine Essence.
ReplyDeleteNow one could say that the body adds to the operations of the mind. This is undeniable. However, the operations that it adds, in St. Thomas' mind, are those that are most shared in common with the brute animals. The calculative powers and the inner senses, the sensible apprehensive and appetitive powers, powers of locomotion, of speech, etc. It also adds to the souls' abilities to have friendships, etc. Most importantly, it makes a disembodied "anima" into an "animal", an "homo". It adds whole new operations and powers than can be fulfilled and participate in happiness and way of life produced through the beatific vision. What it does NOT add or essentially change is the ability of the mind to engage in the beatific vision, except virtually, insofar as the other powers which could share in the beatific vision (though not in its deepest essence), are united to and rooted in the mind.
St. Thomas agrees that happiness consists in the aggregation of all goods. He agrees that adding the body adds something to happiness. What he will not grant is that it adds something to beatitude.
I think you have two options if you want to disagree with the argument of these 5 questions but accept the definitions of the Church.
1) Take the Grisez account and deny that fulfillment is in God alone. State that the bodily goods that one lacks because of the body deprives one of something of the essence of beatitude.
2) State that the presence of the body in some way adds to the essence of the beatific vision.
Other than that, you can think that he should have used other terms, but the insight seems true. If happiness consists most properly in possessing God, there is a distinction between the fullness of happiness one would have in possessing God, and the way of living out this happiness that can come from possessing all other goods that fall short of God Himself.
IN SUM: There are 2 senses of happiness in St. Thomas, one objective sense, that in which happiness consists (in quo consistit), and other the experience of happiness. In trying to pursue a deep distinct about that in which happiness most especially consists, I don't think he is meaning to state anything at all about the experience of happiness other than that. An analogy to this would be someone who is in utter involuntary poverty but who is very holy. This person may be starving and suffering in many ways, and in these ways this person may fall short of the notion of happiness, but if God is pouring out faith, hope, and love into this person's life, this person is happier in a deeper, more essential sense. This doesn't deny that food, shelter, health, friends, etc. are all important to happiness, it just means that relationship with God is on a different plane.